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Abstract:  
While the dominant perspective in the state failure debate has described underdeveloped African 
countries as inherently undemocratic and dysfunctional, South Africa is deemed as an emerging 
economic power with exemplary democratic practices. At the same time, proponents of the 
democracy-development theory have made claims about the alleged relationship between a 
nation's socio-economic progression and its democratic institutions. Focusing mainly on South 
Africa, this article examines the validity of these claims and argues that given the prevailing 
race-based social divide and the immense socio-economic disparity, the process of 
democratization in South Africa has been rather limited. Indeed, democracy in South Africa 
manifests severe weaknesses equal to other African countries. Notwithstanding these 
weaknesses, the advent of social movements such as the Landless People's Movement points to 
the opening of a new democratic space that provides political opportunities for citizens.  
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Introduction 
The subject of “democratization in Africa” has increasingly captured the interest of many 
scholars within social and political science circles for decades, which has resulted in  a large 
body of literature being dedicated to exploring this topic1.  Analysts from this literature in the 
state-failure debate diagnose the majority of African countries with "bad governance" and 
describe their "underdevelopment" as a result of their undemocratic tendencies (Potter, 2000, p. 
381). Yet, South Africa, the most economically advanced country on the continent, is often 
                                                             
1 (Mamdani (1996) “Citizen and Subject: Contemporary   African and the Legacy of Late Colonialism”; Barkan 
(2002) “The Many Faces of Africa: Democracy Across a Varied Continent”; Widner (2005) “Africa’s 
Democratization: A Work in Progress” (to mention a few). 
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esteemed as a success story of a functioning democratic regime and the leading paradigm for 
other African nations. This preposition is made in consideration to South Africa’s turbulent 
history of apartheid and the following transition to Western liberal democracy (Schlemmer and 
Moeller, 1997). Nevertheless, forty-five years of institutionalized racial segregation has 
undoubtedly left ingrained scars on this highly fragmented society. The dismantling of official 
apartheid and the inauguration of democratic institutions did little to transform the dispersed 
social fabric of South Africa into a nation-state (Schlemmer and Moeller, 1997). Hence, Rejai 
and Enloe’s (1969, p. 140) concept of the “state-nation” is still very useful in the South African 
context.  
 
As a semi-industrialized and proclaimed democratic country, South Africa provides a 
unique case study in investigating the strengths and weaknesses of the democracy-development 
theory. According to Osabu-Kle (2000), democracy “includes accountability, transparency in 
decision-making, responsiveness, and legal process that require the consolidation of a complex 
array of ancillary institutions” (p. 77). In this sense, democracy heavily rests upon interactive 
state-civil societal relations based on mutual responsibility. Even though it remains a contested 
concept, this essay will explore the government’s responsibility in ensuring the social rights of 
citizenry in a democratic regime, and illustrate the inseparable intersection between economic 
forces and democracy. This paper will argue that race-divided societal fabric, in connection with 
tremendous socio-economic inequality has stalled the process of democratization in South 
Africa. Notwithstanding these constraints, the emergence of social movements is a clear 
indicator of the new originating democratic space that provides political opportunities for 
concerned citizens. The delicate issue of the government’s (African National Congress) land 
reform policy and the citizens’ struggle over land distribution (with specific reference to the 
Landless People's Movement) shall form the case study for an analysis of development and 
democratization linkage.  
 
The New South Africa: New Democracy and Economic Orientation in an Old Divided 
Society 
Schlemmer and Moeller (1997) elucidate the complexity of South African society that is 
characterized by racial, ethnic, and socio-economic division. The distinction between the 
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industrialized and commercial urban centres and subsistent production in the rural areas of the 
country constitute another challenge to South African society. It is widely accepted that the 
nature of South Africa’s distorted social structure is a product of its history. Economic 
disempowerment, segregation, and racism towards non-Whites framed the political ideology of 
South Africa until its first multiracial and democratic election on 27 April 1994 (Schlemmer and 
Moeller, 1997).  In this respect, South Africa can be considered a ‘state-nation’ rather than a 
nation-state in the process of nation-building (Rejai and Enloe, 1969, p. 150). Similar to other 
African 'state-nations', South Africa represents a classic example of a sovereign territory with 
established political structures; which lacks a sense of national identity and cultural integration. 
In other words, the states’ geographic boarders originated before nationalism was manufactured.  
This political composition has severe ramifications for South Africa’s national culture, the 
character of the state and most importantly, resource distribution.  
 
Like many African countries, South Africa is affected by the forces of neoliberal 
globalization. However, as Ballard (2005) points out, the process is informed by antagonist race 
relations or what can be termed as the ‘politicization of race,’ meaning race has become the 
determinant for resource allocation.  While the political system under apartheid was constructed 
to benefit the White minority, the new democracy in post-apartheid era is predominantly 
advantageous for Black South Africans (Ballard, 2005).   
 
 The transition from apartheid to democratic institutions entailed a cogent compromise 
solution in which the ANC governments was to adhere to neoliberal economic orientation as a 
trade-off to implement programs that will combat the economic disenfranchisement of Black 
South Africans. The result of neoliberal globalization has been paradoxical with Blacks both 
reaping the benefits as well as experiencing further economic and social marginalization 
(Ballard, 2005). On the one hand, a small proportion of Black elites have witnessed financial 
gains under the new regime, but on the other hand the vast majority of Blacks remain in poverty, 
with minimal employment opportunities (Ballard, 2005). This in turn raises questions of 
structural continuity and the “newness” of South African social configuration. With the first 
democratic elections in 1994, citizens’ expectations were evoked. Many asserted that the 
introduction of democracy would facilitate development.  
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Exploring the Democracy-Development Nexus in the South African Context 
Scholars have long been polarized in regards to the democracy-development nexus theory. Even 
though the debate appears to be dominated by those who attribute “underdevelopment” to the 
lack of democracy, it is worth noting that there is no universal accepted or established position 
on this subject matter (Potter, 2000, p.374).  While Minier (1998) asserts a direct symbiotic 
relationship between the economic performance of a country and liberal democracy, Durry, 
Kriekhaus, and Lusztig (2006) on the other hand, provide a more comprehensive understanding 
on this matter. They note that corrupt practices limit the prospects of economic growth and stifle 
productivity. At the same time, they also pointed to the ability of democracy to ameliorate the 
negative effects of corruption on economic development. Drawing on time-series cross-section 
data from one hundred countries between 1987 and 1997, they concluded that non-democratic 
regimes experience greater economic damage in the face of corruption compared to democratic 
nations. This position is in line with many other analysts who claim that the values of liberal 
democracy including freedom of speech and association, the rule of law, protection of human 
rights, all create an enabling environment for economic development to occur (Adejumobi, 2000, 
pp. 4-5).  
 
This argument is viewed with caution by more critical scholars who contest the idea of a 
necessary causal relationship between economic development and democratization (Colaresi & 
Thompson, 2003, pp. 381-382). In fact, quantitative research conducted by Svante Ersson and 
Jan-Erik Lane indicates weak correlations between democracy and economic growth 
(Adejumobi, 2000, p.5). 
 
Certainly, both propositions provide an insight into the nature of the debate. However, 
they remain limited due to the following reasons: firstly, they offer limited interpretation of 
democracy.  Most political scientists engaged in the democracy-development conversation fail to 
make a distinction between democracy as a political concept with underlying principles, and 
liberal democracy that represents a particular type of democracy. The problem with this approach 
is that it rests on particular assumptions regarding liberal democracy, especially its alleged 
universality and suitability to every state irrespective of the specific socio-cultural framework. 
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Arguably, there is a tendency to equate the concept of democracy with the electoral system, 
multiple parties, parliamentary rule, and bureaucracy. Yet the term itself refers to any political 
form which is based on the “rule by the people, as contrasted with rule by a special person or 
group. It is a system of decision making in which everyone who belongs to the political organism 
making the decision is actually or potentially involved” (Routledge Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy). Liberal democracy then, is a specific Eurocentric construction of the term, entailing 
its own political and social organizations. In light of this, scholars like Osabu-Kle’s (2000, p. 9) 
have powerfully argued that only a democracy that is compatible with the African culture can 
create an environment that allows for development in Africa.  
 
Secondly, there is also the trend to regard development as equivalent to economic growth 
and elide the social, cultural, and human dimensions of what constitutes development. Thus, it is 
vital that any serious discussion on the interplay between democracy and development 
commence with a thorough examination of the two concepts at hand.  
 
Thirdly, democracy and development are often seen as two separate spheres with a cause-
and-effect relationship rather than integrated socio-economic and political processes as Osabu-
Kle’s definition of democracy suggests.    
  
 When translating the democracy-development discussion into the South African context, 
it becomes apparent that a more comprehensive analysis is required in regards to the interplay of 
these socio-economic and political processes. A global comparison situates South Africa in an 
upper-middle-income society, making it one of the most economic advanced nations in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Schlemmer and Moeller, 1997).  However, South Africa’s contemporary 
economic advantage is related to historical events and legislative measures, which enabled the 
White minority government during apartheid to forcefully dislocate indigenous Africans to 
reserves and take possession of their farming land (Daniels, 1989). In addition to that, the 
apartheid system ensured the socio-economic head start of the white population as they occupied 
position in the high-income generating sector of the economy (administrative jobs, public sector 
jobs, business owners, large-scale farmers, etc) while Africans served as general labourers 
(Daniels, 1989).  Hence, the present uneven land distribution, racial tension and socio-economic 
 6 
 
inequality have their roots in colonial South Africa. Certainly, the engineering of South Africa’s 
economic development was not accompanied by democratic principles but rather by 
discriminatory racialized policies. This secured the political power of the White minority 
population, which allowed them to appropriate land and resources, and subsequently 
disenfranchised the Black majority of their social, political and economic rights as citizens. 
 
In this respect, the South African case unveils the inadequacies of the democracy-
development relationship and thus demands for a new theoretical framework, which takes into 
consideration various social, economic and political factors.   The subject of land distribution is 
an area that demonstrates the complex interaction between social, economic and political forces, 
as well as the challenges and opportunities it poses to democracy and development in South 
Africa.  
 
Land Distribution: A Matter of Economic & Social Justice? 
Land reform in South Africa poses an extremely complicated affair as it entails the racial politics 
of land distribution; questions surrounding communal land ownership; human rights versus land 
as a private property with an emphasis on profit-making; and citizens’ rights to economic 
security and social justice.  
 
Despite the attempts of the ANC government to implement a land reform policy, many 
South African citizens, especially landless peasants, have enunciated their dissatisfaction with 
the slow pace of the process (James, 2007).  Of particular concern is the government’s market-
oriented approach to land distribution that essentially expedites the interests of African 
commodified landowners and thus disregards the majority of landless people. As von Lieres 
(2007) delineates, the government’s land policy comprises three different programs: the land 
distribution program, the land restitution program, and the tenure reform program. The land 
distribution program intends to provide greater access to land for the Black majority. At the heart 
of the land restitution program is the restoration of land or other forms of redress to people who 
lost their land due to the racially discriminatory laws and practices since 1913. The third program 
seeks to protect the rights of farm dwellers living under insecure arrangements on private and 
state (communal) farm land.  
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However, under the official government program, landowners must be willing to sell the 
land and it can only be purchased at the market value. There is thus a strong focus on the 
commodification of land (Greenberg, 2004).  As a result, the language of “rights” and “property” 
has come to circulate the political debate on the possession or the lack of land.   While the rights 
discourse is rooted in the notion of land as a natural right with an egalitarian connotation, the 
concept of property on the contrary, leans on the idea of private ownership and the 
commercialization of land (James, 2007). Furthermore, this debate is part of a broader debate on 
citizenship and rights.  
 
In his most influential work Citizenship and Social Class, Marshall conceptualizes 
citizenship and outlines three elements of citizenship: civil, political, and social (Marshall, 2000, 
p. 30). For the purpose of this paper, the focus will be on his idea of citizens’ social rights. 
Marshall defines the social element of citizenship as the “right to a modicum of economic 
welfare […] according to the standard prevailing in society”. Thus, Marshall’s understanding of 
citizenship is not limited to the membership of a national community but includes socio-
economic entitlements  
  
Landless People's Movement and Democratization in South Africa 
Many South Africans who see the need to ameliorate the socio-economic inequalities that exist 
in the land sector, conceive citizenship similarly to Marshall's concept of citizenship. Demands 
for land equity are interpreted as socio-economic entitlements because fair access to land 
provides a tool to restore citizenship and to concede a majority of South Africans their social 
rights (James, 2007).  
 
 In making their land claims, the Landless People’s Movement stand in line with the 
citizenship and rights discourse. The movement was founded in June 2001 as a response to the 
government’s shortcomings in dealing with land distribution. James (2007) informs us that the 
first time they received media attention occurred after a report on their meeting in Johannesburg 
in which they boldly verbalized their intention to forcefully seize and distribute land  if the ANC 
government continued their failed land reform program. Their demands include tenure security 
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and the redistribution of a minimum of 30% of farm land to landless people (Greenberg, 2004). 
The movement also advocates for the ending of evictions on agricultural lands or other informal 
settlements.  
 
 Economic security is certainly one of the main factors why land redistribution is of 
utmost significance, but at the same time Greenberg states that within the South African 
population, land redistribution is widely supported for reasons of social justice.  
 Although the movement has been instrumental in echoing the concerns of the public and forcing 
up agrarian issues on the political agenda, the government has not shown any sign of 
collaboration but rather continue to condemn the activities of the movement (James, 2007).   
 
Clearly, the case of the Landless People’s Movement illustrates a tense state- civil society 
relation. Ballard (2005) noted that several social movements arose in South Africa due to the 
lack of opportunities for meaningful political participation that allow for the inclusion of citizens 
in the decision-making process. Ironically, some government officials even perceive social 
movements to be counterproductive to the democratization process in South Africa. Yet 
according to von Lieres (2007), social movements should be seen as a new space for state-civil 
societal engagement which in fact strengthens democracy. In equal measure, Adejumbobi (2000) 
suggests that it is not adequate to have a democracy solely based on elections, abstract political 
rights and voting, but rather the people must have "real decision making powers" (pp.13).  
 
In this respect, social movements generate great opportunities: they allow for 
participation from below and thus create a new democratic capacity for marginalized 
communities. Yet, von Lieres also mentions that the new democratic arena remains situated in 
old attitudes and practices.  The historical experience of an authoritative state during apartheid, 
which denied citizens access to formal political institutions, has created an adversarial and 
confrontational state-civil society relation.  This is certainly true with the Landless People’s 
Movement (LPM). As previously noted, the conflicting interpretations of entitlement in the land 
sector limit the prospects for a consensual agreement between citizens and state officials (von 
Lieres, 2007). However, the conflictual relationship with the government only represents one of 
the many challenges facing the Landless People Movement. A microscopic view of the 
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movement shows some considerable internal frailties which is impeding their capacity to affect 
change.  
 
Internal Dynamics of the Landless People’s Movement 
For James (2007) there is no doubt that the Landless People’s Movement has failed in 
establishing a close relation with the rural poor in South Africa. According to him, many of the 
movement’s potential members have not joined and likely will not join, due to the clientelistic 
approach of the leadership.  James considers their attempt to form global alliances as a means to 
offset the outage in mobilizing their landless people nationally. Borras, Edelman & Kay (2008) 
draw our attention to the representation claims of numerous transnational agrarian movements 
which are problematic. In reality, representation is “dynamically (re)negotiated within and 
between leadership and membership sections over time” (Borras, Edelman & Kay, 2008, p. 182).   
A movement’s representation claim may not always reflect the truth but since it forms an 
essential part of their justification for action, such claims are perpetuated.  Borras, Edelman & 
Kay speak of “partial representation” both globally and nationally, and that transnational 
agrarian movements like the Landless People Movement cannot fully represent the vast and 
diverse people and interest of potential members.  
 
The process of constructing a “landless identity” for the movement is accompanied with 
practical obstacles. The vast majority of South Africans both residing in the urban and rural areas 
can be classified as landless. In other words, most South Africans including those working in the 
formal economy live on land that legally belongs to the state or private owners (Greenberg, 
2004). The question then becomes which of the landless people does the movement actually 
represent? The composition of the membership has been harshly disputed by many opponents of 
the movements including former president Thabo Mbeki (James, 2007). The leaders of these 
movements have had to defend its authenticity, as it has been called into question on the grounds 
of its membership.   
Even though land seizure has proven to be ineffective, the movement continues to 
embark on this disputable method to express their frustration and strong desire for rapid 
redistribution of land (Greenberg, 2004). The government response has been to arrest members 
of the movement and insist that their resistance to the land occupation strategy will remain 
 10 
 
unchanged (James, 2007). Ironically, members of the Landless People’s Movement interpret the 
government’s behaviour as a call to more land occupation initiatives. In highlighting their 
demands, the movement does not abstain from controversial tactics, as they have even 
demonstrated their support for Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe’s land expropriation 
programme (Greenberg, 2004). 
 
Another dubious aspect of the movement is the radical and racist rhetoric some members 
have utilized in making their demands. White farmers have been the target of such “hate speech” 
which has led to an overemphasis of race relations.  In 2004, the South African Human Rights 
Commission accused Mangaliso Kubheka from the KwaZulu-Natal LPM of including the slogan 
"kill the farmer, kill the boer" in a speech (Adams, 2004).  Even though this incidence evoked 
the racial dimension of the land struggle, it is important to note that race is not the only factor 
(James, 2007). Hence, the media-exaggerated race and conflict-ridden depiction of the 
interaction between Black landless people and Whites must be viewed with caution (James, 
2007).  
 
Broad generalizations of farm dwellers’ experiences have undermined local variations 
(James, 2007). The movement has rather aggregated the diverse experiences and interests into a 
simplistic demand for land with a strong tenacious tone.  Their failure to incorporate these 
differences in experience has stifled the potential of the movement.  
 
Notwithstanding these challenges, the movement has been extremely successful in raising 
awareness on the issue of landless citizens and vocalizing their demands.  Giving the media 
attention and size of the membership (about 100,000 people), it is difficult for the state to simply 
ignore the voice of the people (von Lieres, 2007).  According to von Lieres, the case of the LMP 
demonstrates the government’s unwillingness to cultivate a political culture of civic engagement 
in new policies, rules, and regulations.   
Indeed progress in the struggle for land has resulted in little to no gains.  Yet it is only 
natural that such a politically-charged issue, with the capacity to bring many issues to the fore 
(ranging from historical injustices, racial relations, to claims of indigenous land entitlements and 
the commodification of land), would generate serious conflicts. Therefore, democracy is 
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understand as Osabu-Kle defines it, as “a means by which the people as a whole can determine 
their own fates, determine the direction of  their societies through representation, responsiveness 
and accountability”, then we can assert that the practice of democracy will always involve 
contestation.  The democracy in post-apartheid South Africa reveals various flaws. Nevertheless, 
social movements like the Landless People's Movement (in spite of their internal deficiencies) 
possess the capacity to facilitate a dialogue between citizens and the state, and subsequently 
cultivate healthy state-civil society relations rooted in democratic principles.   
 
Conclusion 
There is no doubt that the hyper-racial identities and the absence of national unification make it 
difficult to sustain democratic practices in South Africa. It has become clear that the 
consolidation of a healthy democratic environment is not restricted to multiparty systems and 
elections, but more so tied to the socio-economic realities of the people. Therefore, the 
significance of equitable distributional system of resources cannot be undermined. This paper 
has also depicted the limits to the democracy-development thesis both on a theoretical level and 
within the South African context. Indeed, South Africa is praised as a relevant example of an 
efficient democracy with increasing economic prospect. However, what most scholars miss is 
that South Africa’s Western democratic institutions and practices are still alien to the majority of 
the population. More importantly, this type of democracy fails to accommodate issues 
surrounding race relations and unequal distribution of resources such as land. Yet while South 
Africa might fall behind when it comes to certain democratic principles, it is also important to 
acknowledge the new democratic space that has allowed citizens to mobilize and raise their 
concerns to the ruling party. Social movements such as the Landless People’s Movement have 
been instrumental in transforming citizen relations with the state. These movements present a 
channel for historically marginalized citizens to campaign for their rights and access their 
citizenship’s entitlements. The increase in citizen participation gives some hope for a future 
democracy in South Africa that is built upon the voice of its citizens.  
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